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State and Federal Powerst
By

B. FRANKLIN*
Most of us were exposed to government and politics in our formal education at a 'time when we had no experience and little interest in either. Since
then we. have been so busy, or think we are, that we have neglected politics,
leaving government to others, only to complain that they are not running .it
as we think they should. Democracy, more than any other form of government known to man, needs strong leadership from the people most qualified
for leadership. When we fail to be interested and exert influence upon government we have no one to blame but ourselves if the results in government
are not satisfactory to us.
Too many of our people who have capacity for leadership neglect both
national and state politics. We are members of service clubs and similar
organizations which, either by provision of a written constitution or by
tacit understanding, are non-political, and in adhering to this principle we
become impotent iridividually and collectively in most, if not all, controversial
issues. We permit intolerable conditions to exist in some of our state institutions; we permit party politics to play havoc with our state merit system,
the civil service; we under-pay our public school teachers and at the same
time complain about the quality of the teaching in our public schools; we
spend our money to advertise the state as a fisherman's paradise and permit
the hands of the state game and fish commission to be tied while the best
part of our streams are closed to public fishing. We complain about the
inroads of federal authority in the regulation of local matters and at the
same time allow conditions to continue which make it improbable if not impossible for our state legislative body to properly discharge its duties. We
are penny wise and pound foolish. We provide that the state legislature
shall meet once in two years and we pay our state legislators the munificent
sum of $1,000 for this important function of state government. At the
same time we think congress should be constantly in session. It is surprising that the legislature does as well as it does under the circumstances.
To correct this I believe our legislature should meet each year and, even
better, that it should meet continuously with compensation adequate to atWALTER
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tract qualified and competent men to our legislative halls. Only by so do,
ing can be expect the state to exercise the power which inherently belongs
to it.
For fear of offending someone or because we are timid to challenge what
we think is wrong we permit such things as an amendment to the state constitution providing for old age assistance. Not that we are opposed to old
age assistance but it should never have been a part of the constitution; rather
it should be a matter subject to the control of the state legislature.
We see many of our people willing to trade economic and political'
independence for promises of security from a presently benevolent government, and while doing so create a political atmosphere in which -man may
again become the victim of government rather than the master of it.
We are alarmed at the top heavy structure of government, particularly
the national government, with its innumerable bureaus, commissions and
administrative bodies; its hordes of administrative personnel who swarm us
under with directives, regulations and required reports, and who, it seems,
increase in numbers at an alarming rate; who delve increasingly into our
every day affairs telling us what we can do, what we must do. We shudder
at the prospect of the tax burden which we must endure to pay the increased
overhead of a federal government which has become a little dizzy in its
power and more and more regards the states as unnecessary evils in present
day government.
Originally the federal government existed only for the benefit of the
states. The constitution of the United States still indicates this theory but
there has been a shift in power so that more and more the once proud sovereign
states become subervient to a government from Washington.
How did this happen? Who did it? Where will we wind up?
The shift in power from the states to the national or federal government
cannot be laid to any single factor.
Business interests are partly to blame. It was business which, unable or
unwilling to govern itself, asked for government intervention by approving
and enforcing codes of fair practice, got them in the N.I.R.A., but as is
usually the case got more than they asked for and paved the way for federal
regulation through the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
It was business which caused a corporation to be classed as a person
under the fourteenth amendment and thereby make corporations subject
to federal authority when it was never intended that the fourteenth amendmnt should include any one but a natural person.
States, by failing to exercise their sovereign powers in dealing with matters of public interest (which failure was due in part at least by the failure of
state legislatures to meet the additional responsibilities imposed upon them
by changing conditions), have created a vacuum into which it was natural
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that the federal power would move. Merely putting a law on the state
statute books is by no means full exercise of the state power. There must be
enforcement of state laws and in this respect many states fail miserably.
Congress has played its part by passing laws not within the expressly
enumerated powers of congress and which by fair interpretation or implication are not included within the incidental powers of congress.
The Supreme Court of the United States has had a lion's share in the
process of expanding the federal power and in degrading states power by
making itself an appellate court from state supreme court decisions, by reading into laws intentions which cannot be drawn from the law itself, and by
upholding laws of congress which are outside the letter and outside the
spirit of the constitution as that spirit was conceived by its framers.
Any discussion of federal power and states rights must, of necessity,
revolve around the constitution of the United States, the events which preceded its adoption, and the events which have occurred since its ratification.
There is no document so extolled by our people, perhaps by the literate
people of the world, as is the constitution of The United States. Every
public official and quasi public official is sworn to uphold it. There are
probably more speaking acquaintances with it than with any other document
in the world. Other nations have used it as a pattern. Mexico's constitution
is remarkably parallel and I am told that even the dormant constitution of
Russia is strikingly similar. It is quoted and misquoted, paraphrased and
referred to by people of all walks of life; by politicians, preachers, reformers;
by teachers, business men, students, workmen, farmers, and even by criminals.
It is relied upon by proponents of license as well as by truthful advocates
of freedom. It is held up to the world by the dogmatists as the panacea for
all human ills, as a pattern for all peoples in the quest of protection of individual and human rights against tyranny, and as recipe to all nations
who would live in peace with their neighbors.
Yet for all these evidences of familiarty there is so little specific, concrete, accurate knowledge of that great chart of government; so little realization that its guarantees of liberty are not grants of liberty by the government
to the people but limitations upon the exercise of governmental power--limitations which the people themselves put there and should ever safeguard. The
very foundation for that much vaunted "American Way of Life" is badly
neglected and misunderstood by our people; we are far too prone to take the
blessings of liberty for granted.
The constitution of The United States is relatively short, it is written
in comparatively simple language, it has been read and reread by many people, including teachers, who have taken its simple words at their face value,
with little or no knowledge of the political atmosphere in which it was born,
of the struggle between advocates of strong centralized power and the advocates of strong state power, of the political theories argued and deliberately
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discarded by the convention before the delegates affixed their signatures to
its final draft, and with little understanding of the fear by Americans that
the proposed new government would be just another tyrant to oppress the
common man of this continent. This feeling was perhaps best exemplified
by Rhode Island, the state founded by Roger Williams, one of our greatest
advocates of individual freedom. Rhode Island refused even to send delegates to the convention; she was the last state to ratify the constitution and
then only after the people had once rejected ratification by a substantial majority.
North Carolina and Virginia, too, were slow to ratify the constitution
feeling that the rights of the states and of the people were not sufficiently
safeguarded. Each proposed many amendments; and, as we know, the bill
of rights, consisting of the first ten amendments, was adopted within three
years and are considered as a part of the original constitution.
In 1793 the states were shocked by the federal court decision (Chisholm
vs. Georgia) which recognized a power in the federal courts to entertain a
case against a state by one not a citizen of the state and, jealous of this infringement upon the sovereignty of the states, were quick to ratify the
eleventh amendment in 1795 which forbade the recurrence of such an event.
Reading the constitution and rereading it is only the first step in constitutional law study. Practically every sentence of the constitution, one
might almost say every word, has been the subject of controversy and ultimate
interpretation by court decisions. No study of the constitution is worthy to
be called such without a study of these cases. Many teachers, without knowing it, are guilty of giving out much misinformation about the constitution.
When political union of the states occurred in 1777 thru confederation,
the states had already been engaged in the war of independence for more
than two years. It was quite natural that the people of the states should
distrust strong government and that in the Articles of Confederation only
a loose union was effected. The Articles of Confederation are in rhany
provisions strikingly similar to the constitution and it is obvious, even to
the casual reader, that they were drawn upon heavily by the framers of
the constitution. The articles formed merely a league of friendship for the
common defense against foreign invaders. There was no power to collect
taxes for the support of the federal government and therefore the federal
government was almost powerless. Some provisions of the articles are worthy
of notice in this discussion. The second article, for instance, stated that each
state retained its sovereignty, freedom and independence and every power,
jurisdiction, and right which is not by this confederation expressly delegated
to the United States. Except for the deletion of the word "expressly" this is
very much the language of the tenth amendment adopted in 1793, but of
course the omission of that word is highly significant.
After the War of Independence trade between the states and with for-
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eign countries was obstructed by barriers and handicaps created by the states
and by the helplessness of the states against marauders flying the flag of
foreign nations. It was primarly to correct this bad situation in trade that
the second continental congress approved a convention to amend the Articles
of Confederation but with no thought in mind of revolutionary changes in
the federal system. The delegates to this meeting, which we now call the
Constitutional Convention went considerably astray from the task which
they had been called upon to perform. When the delegates, after much
debate, decided upon the bold stroke of revamping the system of government, several delegates left the convention, refusing to participate in any
such departure from their stated instructions. The story of the convention
with its heated debates, and ultimate compromises forms an interesting chapter
in our national history. So do the events between its proposal and ratifica
tion of the constitution. Some historians tell us that had it not been for the
great confidence in George Washington and the general belief that he would
be our first president the states would probably have refused to ratify the
proposed constitution.
In the first twelve years of our history under the constitution there was
little debate over the division of state and federal powers. The United States
Supreme Court had not played a conspicious part in these twelve years; but
during the last weeks of his term as president John Adams appointed John
Marshall to be the third Chief Justice of The Supreme Court and things
began to happen. Marshall was a Federalist. He had served in the revolutionary forces with Washington, had seen the suffering of our armies and
had long since recognized the need for a strong national government if the
United States was to become a power among world nations. By a series of
decisions lasting thru his thirty-five years as Chief Justice, his court fixed
the power of the Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional laws of congress
and of the state legislatures, (Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 1803),
and set the pattern by which incidental and implied powers of the national
government were to expand the national powers far beyond anything dreamed
of by the states when they ratified the constitution, (McCullock vs. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 1819).
The die was cast and the battle between advocates of state power and
strong central government entered upon a new phase. With each court decision which strengthened the national power, and there were quite a few of
them, the states fumed and there were threats of secession.
Looking back from our present perspective, Marshall has taken on the
roll of the greatest of all of our Chief Justices. He performed a great service
to the country, and had the recognition of incidental powers, as stated in McCullock vs. Maryland, never occurred, we might yet be a hodgepodge of
small nations, with little to pull us together but a common language and a
common fear of the great .foreign powers. However, Marshall was quite
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meticulous to distinguish between strictly local matters and matters which
of necessity called for national power, but even this effort at careful discrimination was not enough to win for him or his court the confidence of
the states.
The states which were the first 'Members of the union were intensely
jealous of their sovereignty. They believed that the union existed for the
benefit of the states and for no other reason. The generally held theory that
a sovereign was not bound, except morally, to its contract was believed in to
the extent that the states considered themselves free to renounce their membership in the union at their own pleasure. This attitude epitomized the
extreme position with respect to states' rights and it took a civil war to
settle, we hope for all time, this aspect of states' rights..
Not always has the court used the logic and meticulous care of Marshall. Had it done so there would no doubt still have been criticism from
some states' righters. There does seem to be a basis for criticism of the
court the logic of which is difficult to combat. I refer to the technique of
reading into the constitution national powers for which the intelligent reader,
even by fair implication can find no basis and in which the conservative contends the court throws out a lot of verbage as camouflage to cover the preconceived belief of the court that such matters should be within the federal
jurisdiction.
May I quote from the court language which makes subsequent language
of the court sound like double talk?
"When the people create a single, entire government they grant at once
all the rights of sovereignty .....
.But
when a federal government is
erected with only a portion of the sovereign power, the rule of construction is directly the reverse and every power is reserved to the members
that is not, either in express terms or by necessary implication, taken away
from them and vested exclusively in the federal head. This rule has been
acknowledged by the most intelligent friends of the constitution but is also
plainly declared by the instrument itself." (9 John, N.Y., 507, 1812)
Also:
"The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does
not alter. That which it meant when adopted it means now ..... .Those
things which are within its grants of power, as those grants were understood
when made, are still within them and those things not within them remain
still excluded." (So. Carolina vs. U.S,, 199 U.S. 347, 1905).
Also:
"Historical origin may be considered and historical evidence may be
resorted to as aids in the construction and application of words and provisions. What went on before the adoption of the constitution may be resorted to for the purpose of throwing light upon its provisions." (Marshall
vs. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 1919).
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Again:
"The law existing at the time the constitution and amendments were
adopted and ratified, is often the best basis for ascertaining the scope and
effects of a constitutional provision." (Mattox vs. U.S., 156 U.S 237, 1895).
"The government of the United States is one of delegated, limited and
enumerated powers. Every act of congress must find in the constitution a
warrant for its passage. By ratifying the constitution the states carved from
their powers such portions as they thought advisable to vest in the national
government. In the field of external power of the United States is complete but in internal matters the United States is not completely sovereign."
(U.S. vs. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 229 U.S. 334, 1936).
These are but a few of the many similar quotations which could be
cited from opinions of the court.
Stare decisis, i maxim of the common law of the United States and
approved by the Supreme Court as well as by state courts, is a principle
that a point of law once settled by decisions of a court with final jurisdiction forms a precedent not thereafter to be lightly discarded or reversed.
This principle assumes especial significance in constitutional law.
In 1798 the Supreme Court held that a person who had had his day
in court, by the ordinary procedure of the state where his case was tried,
had had the benefit of due process of law and the federal courts would not
review his case on a lack of due process contention. This attitude of the
Supreme Court (Calder vs. Bull, 3, U.S. 386) was consistently held for
100 years and in reaffirming the principle in 1874, (Gilpin vs. Page, 85
U.S. 350), the court said: "The Circuit Court possesses no revisory powers
over decisions of the Supreme Court of a state, and any arguments to show
that the (state) court mistook the law, and misjudged the jurisdictional fact,
would have been out of place."
This remained the rule of the Supreme Court until 1894 when by- its
decision, (Scott vs. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34), the court constituted itself an
appeal court from every decision of a state supreme court whenever the
question of jurisdiction was involved.
In 1888, (Pembina Consolidated Mining and Milling Co. vs. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181), though the question was not involved, the court,
in its dictum, had said: "Under the designation of person there is no doubt
that a corporation is included." The historical setting of the fourteenth
amendment and the words of the amendment when intrepreted in the light
of this setting certainly do not indicate that there was any person except a
natural person to be included within it provisions. Yet the court in 1889,
(Minneapolis Railroad Co. vs. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26), stated that corporations are persons within the fourteenth amendment and since that
time has never waivered from that position. This inclusion has created a
great mass of litigation for the federal courts, and by making the federal

DICTA

courts available to corporations on grounds never intended by the fourteenth
amendment has not only extended the power of the federal government but
has operated to deny states their rightful power over corporations.
The expansion of federal power by court decisions which have interpreted the commerce clause of Article I, Section VIII, of the constitution,
presents a long and interesting story. The provision is short and in rather
plain language. It says: "Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the states, and with the Indian Tribes."
What is the meaning of the word "commerce" and of the word "regulate?"
Around these two words and this section is built much of the power of the federal government. Webster and the court have repeatedly defined commerce as
trade, traffic, exchange, and intercourse. To be interstate, or in the language
of the constitution, "among the states," there must be trade, traffic, exchange or intercouse across state lines, and only when this combination occurs
does the constitution confer power upon the federal government to regulate.
It is under this enumerated power to regulate commerce that congress
has enacted all of the federal anti-trust laws, and pure food and drug acts,
created the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, a host of other bureaus and commissions and enacted most of
the federal labor legislation. Many of our citizens labor under the delusion
that much of our federal legislation, particularly that dealing with labor,
is enacted under a federal police power derived through the general welfare clause. The term "general welfare" appears only twice in the Constitution, once in the preamble, from which the federal government derives
no substantive power, and again in the first paragraph of Article I, Section
VIII, which reads: The congress shall have the power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pa) the debts and provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States. Arguments
have waxed and waned and waxed again as to whether this provision confers a power upon the federal government to legislate generally for the welfare of the United States or merely to lay and collect taxes for the general
welfare of the United States. It would seem to me that reasonable construction can only result in the latter interpretation so I join with that faction.
The United States does exercise a power over commerce, which is so
similar to police power as to defy distinction, when it excludes from interstate commerce such things as lotteries and goods manufactured with child
labor.
Is this, and much of the labor legislation, regulation of commerce?
Are the relations between management and labor commerce? I don't think
so and neither do I think the federal government has any police power
under the welfare clause to control these matters. You may disagree, or
in agreeing say that the ends justify the means. If so, remember what the
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court itself has said about a written constitution and be prepared to sanction
any usurpation of power which the Supreme Court is willing to sanction.
Raising such a question now may be quite academic, for the Supreme
Court seems to have answered it with finality. It justifies its present position by saying that the federal power extends to anything which "affects"
commerce or tends to "obstruct the free flow" of commerce. And so our
local lumber man or our local retailer may find himself indicted by a
federal grand jury for violation of a law which he believes never was intended to apply to his business.
The Supreme Court, in anti-trust cases, for example in E. C. Knight Co.
vs. U.S., (156 U.S. 1, 1895), and in Oliver Iron Mining Co. vs. Lord, (262
U. S. 172, 1923), has held that manufacturing might precede commerce or
succeed to commerce, but that manufacturing itself was not commerce and
that the federal power did not extend to the control of this local economic
activity. It has held that child labor and maximum hours are purely local
matters not within the federal powers and over which the states had control only by virtue of the police power possessed by those sovereigns. It
has even denied, until recently, the power of the states to legislate minimum
wages and has frustrated attempts of congress to legislate against child labor
under the guise of its taxing power. Despite previous decisions, the Supreme
Court has now condoned the power of the federal government in all of these
matters under the guise of regulating interstate commerce.
What have, we gained and what have we lost by all of this federal encroachment into fields which only so short a time ago were regarded as
wholly within the state powers?
Boldly and without batting an eyelash the court has so stretched the
elastic qualities of the constitution that by reading its simple words alone
one can be only misled as to what it means.
With each newly assumed federal power through acts of congress
which are, to put it mildly, of doubtful constitutionality, and with each new
interpretation by the court finding new basis for the exercise of federal power,
the power of the states is further degraded. Every such act and court decision adds another unit to the army of federal inspectors and agents to interfere, supervise and regulate the daily activities of the citizens of the
United States.
Not all of the people, by any means, who are calling these matters to
the attention of the people of the states and counselling caution against too
great concentration of power in the federal government are alarmists, reactionaries or even in the employ of vested interest as they are accused. Many
of them are earnest students of government and constitutional law, imbuded
with the idea that it is distinctly, in the long run, in public interest that the
safeguards of the constitution for balance of powers between state and national governments be preserved. We think of checks and balances in our
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government primarily because of the constitutional provisions creating three
equal and coordinate branches of government. We are prone to overlook
the checks and balances provided by the framers of the constitution when
they consciously and deliberately enumerated the powers of the federal government and, to make sure they were not misunderstood, added an amendment
very soon after the adoption of the constitution stating that all powers not
granted by the states to the federal government not prohibited to the states
by the constitution are reserved to the states.
May I remaind you again that the constitutional guarantees of freedom
and liberty are not grants to the people by a benevolent government; they
are guarantees by way of limitation which the people put into the constitution to protect themselves from their own government, a government which
they hoped and expected to be and remain benevolent but dared not leave
to chance.
Changing conditions sometimes give things a queer twist. The earliest
conservatives in our national history, the Federalists, led by Hamilton, were
strong advocates of centralized power. The liberals of the same period,
led by Jefferson, were bitter in their opposition and fought pugnaciously for
states' rights on the theory that therein lay the safety of the common man.
Now the position is reversed. The liberals of today advocate support of
centralized power while conservatives either oppose further strengthening
of federal power or hope to give it different direction from the trend of the
last several years.
Don't understand from the remarks I have made that I am wholly opposed to what is commonly referred to as our social and economic progress.
I admit that, being a constitutionalists, I don't approve of what I consider
an unconstitutional usurpation of power by federal government; what I am
objecting to mainly is the method by which the federal government has increased its power and the indifference of our people as to what has happened and how it happened.
Perhaps, as Mr. Lilienthal of T.V.A. says, we are a nation of regions
and no longer a nation of states. Perhaps from an economic viewpoint
state lines are obselete. Even if true, is it license to disregard our written
constitution to do the expedient thing? The oath of all public officials,
elected or appointed, is to uphold the constitution of the United States and
not to uphold the expedient interpretation which they, individually or collectively, place upon it.
With the complexities of modern life in a country so large as ours, the
field of national interest is naturally expanding. Some matters which once
were of purely local concern are not longer such. Were there determination
on the part of states to do so, regional matters could be directed and controlled by the states concerned without dictation from the federal government
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at Washington which has little knowledge and less understanding of local
or regional matters.
Over and above the state and regional interests there is, no doubt, a
public interest which is national in scope. That national interest includes
all of us and the national power when exercised should be for the benefit
of all of us and not for powerful or well organized minority interests alone.
What are the direction signs on the path that lies ahead? Certainly the
future lies in action. If the states' rights advocate would defend his position he must snap out of his lethargy and cause the states to exercise the power
which the states have. He must demonstrate in state action that the states
are capable of doing what .the public interest demands. Could the states
be effective in dealing with these matters of public interest? If the federal
government exists for the benefit of the states and will exercise its powers
on that basis and if the states will work together I believe the states can
take care of the public interest and at the same time preserve our constitutional
government. Elective officials, both state and federal, are generally more
responsive to public opinion than appointive officials. Generally local administration is more responsive than administration removed from the people.
If these premises are sound, administration by the states is preferable to
administration from Washington. We have had a few examples in our
state government to indicate that appointive officials can be quite arbitrary
but none to compare with examples in our federal administration with its
three million or more appointees. The federal government can and should
exercise its taxing power for the general welfare of the United States, but
with a minimum of bureaus and personnel, leaving administration to the
states. To a degree we have seen this operate in old age assistance, unemployment insurance and some other matters which are of general public
interest.
What are the other alternatives?
At various times in our history, one within my own memory-during
the Roosevelt Supreme Court packing controversy-it has been advocated
that the constitution be amended to give the federal government police
power. Such an amendment would no doubt constitutionalize most of the
things which the federal government has done in the field of social legislation. However, such an amendment would so broaden the power of the
federal government as to practically do away with the state power and is
therefore not acceptable to the conservative who is afraid of a strong central government. It would increase tremendously the number of administrative bureaus and commissions and in so doing increase the most dangerous
hazard to our future freedoms.
During the war, war powers enabled the federal government to cope
with the emergency. Except where military necessity dictated otherwise,
publicity was given to the measures taken and the interested public knew
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pretty well what was going on. Appointments were for the duration of the
emergency and we expect a termination of those appointments just as soon
as conditions permit. Strangely, and though the present court would prob,
ably not hold the same, the Supreme Court, during the N.I.R.A. crisis,
said that emergencies do not increase the power of congress. I agree that
under a strict interpretation of the constitution this is true. There are,
however, national emergencies almost as critical as war and which, for our
people at home, could be even more disastrous than any war in which we
have ever engaged. Congress should have the power to declare the existence
of an emergency and, with proper safeguards for the termination of emergency administrative bureaus and boards, be enrpowered to take such steps
as are necessary to remedy the conditions. I would even favor an amendment to this effect in the belief that public opinion could be mustered at
the end of the emergency to terminate federal agencies no longer necessary.
It has not been may purpose to be an alarmist but to call to your attention trends which pose danger for the future of democracy under our constitution. As a middle of the roader I am concerned, for with increasing
concentration of power in Washington it seems to me we are creating conditions in which usurpation becomes ever more possible. Through our schools
and through organizations like this our citizens must be prepared to make
an intelligent choice between the roads which lie ahead.
The conservative who tries only to preserve the status quo is doomed
to lose out. The laws of nature constantly remind us that nothing stands
still. There is constant change, growth or decay. The conservative who
would preserve our constitutional way in American government must have
a plan of action and not a plan of obstruction.

Patton on Titles Missing from Denver District Court Library
The Book Patton on Titles has been withdrawn from the Denver District
Court library without notifying the librarian. This book is in great demand
and additional copies cannot be purchased. All attorneys are requested to

check their desks and libraries to see if this book has been inadvertently misplaced. Anyone finding the missing volume is requested to notify the district court librarian.
New Members of Denver Bar Association
The following were admitted to membership in the Denver Bar Association at the May 6, 1946 meeting:
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LON J. PUTNAM

C. MCKINLAY

